Groupthink

My colleague and friend, Chuck Sooter, asked me to write a blog about Groupthink.  Because I consider this both a most important and relevant topic of discussion today, I agreed to do it.  Noting the origin of the term, it was first used by William H. Whye Jr., the author of The Organization Man, who coined the term “groupthink” in a 1952 Fortune magazine article to describe a “rationalized conformity” in corporate and government decision-making.  Subsequently, Irvin Janis popularized the term in 1972 in an article appearing in Psychology Today when he analyzed past foreign policy disasters.

Both Whyte and Janis borrowed the term from George Orwell, who first used the term “doublethink” in his classic work, 1984, that was published in 1949.  Doublethink maintained the dictatorship, described in 1984, by forcing party members to believe in opposing ideas and accept them both as true.   Groupthink pressures people to suppress doubts and align with group members even when the group’s position may not be rational and unable to support the extant data.

Well before the term groupthink existed, Abraham Lincoln, as president of the United States, understood the peril of homogenous thinking underpinning excessive loyalty.  Lincoln recognized the danger of advisors echoing their leader resulting in decision-making without dissent.  In her book, Team of Rivals, Doris Kearns Goodwin points out how Lincoln intentionally appointed cabinet members who openly disagreed with him.  In this context, Lincoln encouraged debate rather than unilateral support of an idea a cabinet member may have  had.  Lincoln could do this because he was secure enough within himself to accept criticism.

The problems inherent in groupthink manifested themselves when President Kennedy, who had maintained past President Eisenhower’s military advisors, led him astray into the Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba.  It became obvious that the mission with its potential disastrous consequences was not addressed.  The Cuban expatriates were left hanging with no support when U.S.  forces abandoned them.  The Bay of Pigs fiasco has been attributed to groupthink insofar as all of Kennedy’s advisors saw the Cuban problem the same way without contemplating consequences.  

Kennedy changed his view of decision making when he took on advisors who no longer saw things alike but were able to discuss their differences.  Kennedy’s ear was open to alternative approaches.  This tactical way of seeing problematic issues helped him make what subsequently was seen as the right move in the Cuban missile crisis that occurred later.  His confrontation with Khrushchev, in 1962, forced the latter to remove his missile bases, an existential threat to the United States, from Cuba.  Because I lived through the intense nerve ending of this period, I very much remember those scary days when we were all seating at the edge of our seats awaiting a tragedy.  Because Kennedy had the wherewithal to no longer employ likeminded advisors, what could have been a disaster was averted.  

Of the many flaws Trump has, I believe the most serious one is the way in which his advisors act as followers in placating him rather than, on occasion, disagreeing with his intuitions.  He chose cabinet members, not by looking at their competence, but rather by seeing whether they agreed with the views he held on to various issues.  This has created the confirmation bias Trump has had in his decision-making that has disallowed the give and take of further rational discussion. Listening to people that agree with you rarely leads to a thoughtful analysis of worldly issues related to the complicated issues of governance.    If this is how Trump made his decision when Netanyahu and he initiated war against Iran, let us hope and pray that the fragile situation in the Mid-East does not unravel and worsen. 

Apparently, unlike Lincoln and Kennedy, who were secure enough within themselves to accept criticism, Trump does not appear able to accept rebuttals, and that can result in unexamined alternatives that can lead to unintended  consequences.